Unlocking Secure Communities: The Role of the Freedom of Information Act in the Department of Homeland Security\u27s Secure Communities by Tokar, Erica Lynn
Legislation and Policy Brief
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 4
2-17-2013
Unlocking Secure Communities: The Role of the
Freedom of Information Act in the Department of
Homeland Security's Secure Communities
Erica Lynn Tokar
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agency Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the
Immigration Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legislation and Policy Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tokar, Erica Lynn (2013) "Unlocking Secure Communities: The Role of the Freedom of Information Act in the Department of
Homeland Security's Secure Communities," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb/vol5/iss1/4
 Legislation & Policy Brief 103
UNLOCKING SECURE COMMUNITIES: 
THE ROLE OF THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT IN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S SECURE 
COMMUNITIES
By Erica Lynn Tokar*
Introduction ............................................................................................ 103
I. Background.................................................................................... 106
A. Background on The Freedom of Information Act ........... 106
B. Local Enforcement of Immigration Law and  
the Backdrop for Secure Communities ............................... 110
C. The Structure of Secure Communities ............................... 113
II. FOIA in DHS’s Secure Communities ......................................... 116
A. The Role of FOIA in Secure Communities .......................... 116
B. Problems with the Role of FOIA in Secure Communities ... 124
III. Recommendations ......................................................................... 127
A. Substance of Disclosures ...................................................... 128
B. Manner of Disclosures .......................................................... 129
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 131
Introduction
In 1941, members of the Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure agreed unanimously that “an important 
and far-reaching defect of administrative law has been the simple lack 
of public information concerning its substance and procedure.”1 The 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 uniquely addresses this concern 
by providing members of the general public an opportunity to con-
sider and respond to administrative action by viewing actual agency 
records. FOIA affords broad access to “any person,”3 and it has become 
a key tool for both organizations and individuals who not only wish to 
1 Attorney Gen.’s Comm. On Admin. Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8-77, at 25 (1st Sess.1941).
2 Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
3 Id. at § 552(a)(3)(ii) (stating that, with a few exceptions “each agency, upon any request for 
records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published 
rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records 
promptly available to any person”).
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, American University Washington College of Law. Thank you to Professor 
Daniel J. Metcalfe and Katie Weatherford for their time and guidance. I am also grateful to the 
editors and staff at Legislation & Policy Brief for their efforts to bring this article to publication. And, 
of course, thank you to my favorite teacher and perpetual source of inspiration, Matthew Stone.
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learn more about the inner workings of the U.S. government, but also 
seek to participate fully in the democratic process.4
For instance, a FOIA request was the primary tool for interested 
individuals to learn about the Department of Homeland Security’s 
(DHS’s) Secure Communities initiative, including why it was created 
and how it was being implemented. DHS designed Secure Communities 
to enhance and expand current strategies for identifying removable 
immigrants in the United States who have violated a criminal law. 
Under Secure Communities, police check a suspect’s fingerprints dur-
ing an arrest against not only the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI’s) fingerprint database, but also against DHS’s newly established 
immigrant biometric database.5 If the search reveals that the individual 
is an immigrant who is subject to administrative removal, the database 
then automatically delivers information on the individual’s immigra-
tion history to local law enforcement officials so that they may comply 
with a DHS detainer and transfer that person into the custody of DHS’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).6 As of September 2012, 
Secure Communities is active in 97% of jurisdictions in the United 
States and is slated to be implemented in all jurisdictions by 2013.7
Despite Secure Communities’ broad effect, DHS developed and 
implemented it independent of an explicit statutory mandate and with-
out using rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).8 In fact, Congress rejected two pieces of legislation that 
would have provided DHS with a specific statutory mandate to imple-
ment programs that were similar to Secure Communities.9 Rather, 
4 See e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Legislation Introduced to Strengthen Freedom 
of Information Act (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/legislation-
introduced-strengthen-freedom-information-act (“FOIA is not only an invaluable tool for the 
ACLU, other advocacy organizations and reporters, but for all Americans.”).
5 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities Operating Standard 
Procedures § 1 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/
securecommunitiesops93009.pdf. Id. at § 3 (explaining that the premise behind Secure 
Communities technology is biometric interoperability between the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
FBI fingerprint database, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) fingerprint 
database whereby “a single query by a participating local law enforcement agency (LEA) checks 
both systems and confirms the identity and immigration status of a subject being processed during 
incarceration booking”).
6 See generally id. at § 2.2, “Requested Local LEA Cooperative Action” (describing the LEA’s 
responsibility for placing the detainer in the immigrant’s file, informing Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) in the event of the immigrant’s transfer or release, allowing ICE to access the 
detainees, and allowing ICE to acquire information on the immigrant). 
7 Activated Jurisdictions, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (dynamic web document that  
is updated frequently).
8 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551–59, 701–06. 
9 These two bills were the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 
(CLEAR Act), H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003), and the Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 2003 
(HSEA), S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003). Similar versions of both bills were also reintroduced in 2005. 
See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
 Legislation & Policy Brief 105
DHS created Secure Communities in response to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-2410 and congressional priorities for criminal 
alien removal defined in the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Appropriations 
Act.11 DHS has cited its power to implement this program as general 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that pertain 
to the identification and removal of criminal aliens.12
Especially in the early stages of the program’s implementation, DHS 
made little information publicly available about Secure Communities. 
As a result, Congress, advocates, the public, and state officials had 
significant questions concerning how the technology worked, the 
burden that it would place on local law enforcement and, most nota-
bly, whether a state’s participation was voluntary.13 In response, the 
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), in conjunction 
with the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and the Immigration 
Justice Clinic of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, filed a FOIA 
request to gain access to DHS’s records on the program.14 After months 
10 See Homeland Security Presidential Directive-24, Biometrics for Identification and Screening 
to Enhance National Security (June 6, 2008) (stating “The ability to positively identify those 
individuals who may do harm to Americans and the Nation is crucial to protecting the Nation,” 
and therefore directing agencies to streamline technology and develop “a framework to ensure 
that Federal executive departments and agencies agencies [sic] use mutually compatible methods 
and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated 
biographic and contextual information of individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner . . . .”); 
infra note 80 and accompanying text.
11 See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, 110th Cong., Div. E, Tit. II 
(2008) (instructing DHS to “present[] a strategy for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to 
identify every criminal alien, at the prison, jail, or correctional institution in which they are held”); 
infra note 77 and accompanying text.
12 At one time, DHS utilized a Memorandum of Agreement to formalize a state’s participation 
in Secure Communities, which cited DHS’s legal authority for the program as “Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) provisions regarding identification, detention, arrest and removal of aliens 
(8 USC § 1226(c); 8 USC § 1226(d); 8 USC § 1226(e); 8 USC § 1227(a)(2); and 8 USC § 1228); the INA 
provision regarding liaison activities with internal security officers and data exchange (8 USC 
§ 1105); and FY 2008 DHS Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2365 (2007)).” 
For an example of an agreement, see Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement And [State Identification Bureau], 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_
communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf. 
13 See, e.g., Lee Romney, U.S. to Investigate Secure Communities Deportation Program, L.A. Times 
(May 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/18/nation/la-na-secure-communities-20110519 
(discussing the controversy surrounding the program and quoting one community advocate as 
saying Secure Communities “has been shrouded in secrecy and we hope that the OIG takes a real 
and serious look at all aspects of its operation”); Bianca Vazquez Toness, Confusion in Mass. Gov’t 
Over Secure Communities Immigration Program, WBUR Boston’s NPR News Station (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.wbur.org/2011/06/08/secure-communities-5 (“There’s a lot of confusion surrounding 
a new federal immigration initiative. [Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick] previously 
indicated the state would join the program, called Secure Communities. Then on Tuesday, 
Patrick announced he would not sign on because he was told recently that it’s not mandatory.  
But the federal authorities say it is.”).
14 Freedom of Information Act Request by Bridget Kessler, Clinical Teaching Fellow at the 
Immigrant Justice Clinic of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Feb. 3, 2010), available  
at http://ccrjustice.org/files/FOIA%20Request%20-%20ICE%202.3.10%20-FINAL.pdf.
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of litigation, DHS released the materials pursuant to a series of court 
orders and NDLON published the records online, making them available 
to the public.15 The release of these FOIA documents equipped stakehold-
ers with facts that enabled them to understand, meaningfully evaluate, 
and provide informed feedback on Secure Communities for the first time.
This Article examines the role of FOIA in Secure Communities. Part 
I provides background information on the Freedom of Information Act, 
the role of local enforcement agencies (LEAs) in enforcing immigration 
law, and the basic structure of Secure Communities. Part II analyzes 
how FOIA requests facilitated the release of documents and expanded 
public understanding of Secure Communities, and observes that the 
agency’s reliance on FOIA as the primary method for disseminating 
information to the public hampered public participation in shaping 
Secure Communities, undermined public confidence in the agency, 
and caused untold monetary and other costs. Part III recommends that 
agencies prioritize proactive disclosures16 of FOIA records to facilitate 
public access and review of agency policy prior to implementation to 
avoid the lack of transparency that characterized Secure Communities.
I. Background
A. Background on The Freedom of Information Act
Although numerous statutory mechanisms exist to oversee agency 
power and promote accountability,17 FOIA is unique because it goes 
beyond the disclosures initially envisioned by the APA to facilitate 
broad public access to original agency documents.18 Grounded in the 
15 For a listing of the FOIA documents visit http://uncoverthetruth.org/ and click “FOIA documents.”
16 See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
17 See, e.g., The Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (current version at 
5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000)); Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1970) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. app § 2 (2000)). Additionally, for a general discussion of statutes less well-
known than the APA and FOIA that promote transparency and public participation among 
agencies, see generally William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—
Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 171 (2009).
18 Although the APA provides “interested persons” an opportunity “to participate in the rule 
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for 
oral presentation,” records were made available only to those “properly and directly concerned.” 
See Administrative Procedure Act, Ch. 324 § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (repealed 1966). The Attorney 
General made clear in the 1941 manual interpreting the Act that “3(c) is not intended to open up 
Government files for general inspection.” Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act, Dep’t of Justice, 25 (1947), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947ii.
html. FOIA, however, was designed to facilitate much greater transparency by limiting the grounds 
for nondisclosure, and thereby end the perception that agencies favored nondisclosure merely 
to “cover up embarrassing mistakes and irregularities” S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 38 (1966). For a 
straightforward discussion of the “nuts and bolts” of FOIA, see generally, Justin Cox, Maximizing 
Information’s Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13 N.Y. City L. Rev. 387 (2010).
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belief that “sunlight is the best disinfectant,”19 FOIA is designed “to 
pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to 
the light of public scrutiny.”20 Congress adopted FOIA in 1966 as an 
amendment to section 552 of the APA, and has been amended several 
times, including one expansion in 1996 to include provisions concern-
ing electronic access to records.21 With a few exceptions, FOIA requires 
that government entities make government records available to “any 
person”22 who “reasonably describe[s]”23 the records sought and com-
plies with any additional procedural instructions that the agency may 
provide.24 Most often records are made available free of charge or for 
the cost of record duplication.25
A few provisions limit the government’s obligation to disclose. 
For instance, though generally construed broadly, courts have denied 
“agency record” status to some documents, such as handwritten notes.26 
Additionally, documents that are not in official possession of the 
agency or could be characterized as personal property of an individual 
are also not subject to disclosure under FOIA.27 Further, FOIA provides 
nine substantive exemptions from an agency’s obligation to disclose.28 
The exemptions pertain to different forms of governmental privilege, 
individual privacy interests, and commercial privacy interests, such as 
trade secrets.29 If a record is subject to an exemption, FOIA does not 
exempt the entire document from production. Rather, the agency may 
19 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money and 
How the Bankers Use It 62 (Nat’l Home Library Found. ed. 1933)).
20 See Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def, 554 F.3d 274, 283 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Dep’t 
of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991); Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)) 
(discussing the purpose of FOIA in the context of a landmark decision that ordered the disclosure of 
records surrounding the imprisonment of suspected enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
21 See FOIA Update 1979-2000, Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foi-upd.htm (discussing 
the history of FOIA amendments) (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
22 Freedom of Information Act § 552(a)(2)(D).
23 Id. § 552(a)(3)(A).
24 See, e.g., How to Submit a Freedom of Information Act Request (FOIA) or Privacy Act 
Request to the Department of Homeland Security, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., http://www.dhs.
gov/xfoia/editorial_0316.shtm#fees (last reviewed Mar. 25, 2011) (instructing FOIA requesters to 
provide contact information, a description of the records requested, and prepare to pay fees, when 
applicable).
25 The agency may charge a limited fee if the records are sought for commercial use, including 
costs for search, duplication, and review. See Freedom of Information Act § 552(a)(4)(A)
(i). Requesters who are news media, educational, or scientific requesters may be charged for 
duplication. Id. Other requesters may be charged for search time and duplication. Id.
26 See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 155–57 (1980) 
(suggesting that in some circumstances handwritten notes are not agency records).
27 See, e.g., Bureau of Nat’l Affairs v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1496 (2006) (holding 
that an agency official’s calendars of appointments that were kept for personal use and were not 
distributed among staff were not agency records).
28 Freedom of Information Act § 552(b).
29 In 1974, the Privacy Act was enacted largely to address concerns about privacy under FOIA. See 
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006)).
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redact from the document any information pertaining to the applicable 
exemption before producing it to the requester.30 FOIA’s provision 
for judicial review enables requesters to appeal an agency’s decision 
to withhold documents 31 and, particularly because courts have inter-
preted exemptions narrowly,32 the threat of litigation provides agencies 
with an incentive to disclose records that are not clearly exempt.
In addition to the provisions of FOIA that enable individuals to 
request records, FOIA also contains provisions for “proactive disclo-
sures,” which require agencies to release information for general public 
access. The four categories statutorily subject to proactive disclosures 
are: “final opinions [and] . . . orders” in the adjudication of administra-
tive cases, “specific agency policy statements,” “certain administrative 
staff manuals,” and records that “the agency determines have become 
or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for substan-
tially the same records.”33 The agency must place such records online 
in “electronic reading rooms,”34 which are now replacing the in-person 
reading rooms previously staffed by agencies to comply with the pro-
active disclosure requirements.
When President Obama took office in January 2009, he announced 
his commitment to implementing an unprecedented level of openness 
in government through his Open Government Initiative.35 The Obama 
Administration’s Open Government Directive, published in December 
2009, provides a roadmap for the Initiative, and contains specific instruc-
tions and deadlines requiring agencies to promote a government that is 
transparent, collaborative, and fosters public participation.36 Document 
disclosure under FOIA has been one of the Initiative’s cornerstones, 
and Attorney General Eric Holder launched the FOIA innovations by 
announcing a shift from the legal presumption of non-disclosure observed 
by the prior administration, to a presumption favoring openness.37
30 Freedom of Information Act § 552(b) (stating that “any reasonably segregable portion of a record 
shall be provided [to the requester] after deletion of the portions which are exempt”). 
31 Freedom of Information Act § 552(a)(4)(B) (“On complaint, the district court . . . has jurisdiction 
to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency 
records improperly withheld from the complainant.”).
32 See e.g., Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (noting that the exemptions “must 
be narrowly construed”).
33 Freedom of Information Act § 552(a)(2); see Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 756 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (en banc) (observing that subsection (a)(2) records must be made “automatically available 
for public inspection; no demand is necessary”).
34 See Freedom of Information Act § 552(a)(2) (requiring proactively disclosed records created by 
an agency on or after November 1, 1996 to be made available by “electronic means”).
35 Transparency and Government, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009).
36 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB Bull. No. M-10-06: 
Memorandum to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (2009).
37 Office of the Attorney Gen., Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Memorandum to the
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009).
 Legislation & Policy Brief 109
Under the Open Government Initiative, promoting proactive 
disclosure of FOIA records electronically has also been a top priority. 
The Obama Administration has required that agencies “proactively 
use modern technology to disseminate useful information, rather 
than waiting for specific requests under FOIA,” and that records 
should be published “online in an open format that can be retrieved, 
downloaded, indexed, and searched by commonly used web search 
applications.”38 Additionally, Attorney General Holder’s memoran-
dum explicitly encouraged agencies to “systematically” post records 
online in advance of FOIA requests.39 The Obama Administration also 
introduced the website data.gov as another forum for the proactive 
release of government data,40 and required agencies to develop open 
government webpages “to serve as the gateway for agency activities 
related to the Open Government Directive.”41
In response to the Open Government Initiative, DHS, like other agen-
cies, produced an Open Government Plan that affirms its commitment 
to “institutionalizing” proactive disclosure. DHS’s Open Government 
Plan states, “The Department has shifted its focus from by request FOIA 
services to a more proactive approach for sharing information.”42 In 
2008, DHS’s Chief FOIA Officer and Chief Privacy Officer, Mary Ellen 
Callahan, also released a memorandum requiring the agency to increase 
proactive disclosures in specific areas,43 and she invited components to 
release more information to promote transparency.44 The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) concluded that every agency, including DHS, has made 




42 Dep’t Homeland Sec., Open Government Plan 2.0, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/dhs-open-government-plan-v2.pdf.
43 This memorandum directs DHS to proactively disclose: “(1) Historical daily schedules of the 
most senior agency officials (notated to reflect that officials may have deviated from the posted 
schedule and abridged as appropriate for security and privacy concerns); (2) Executed contracts & 
grants; (3) Management directives and instructions; (4) Congressional correspondence under DHS 
control; (5) FOIA logs; (6) Any records released pursuant to a FOIA request that have been, or are 
likely to become, the subject of three or more requests.” Memorandum from Mary Ellen Callahan, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Proactive Disclosure and Departmental Compliance with Subsection (a)
(2) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Aug. 26, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/foia/foia_proactive_disclosure.pdf.
44 Id. at 2 (“[N]othing in this memorandum is intended to limit components’ ability to proactively 
post additional records beyond those suggested consistent with FOIA and other disclosure laws. 
A component may choose to post documents specific to its function in order to further advance 
transparency.”).
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some progress,45 and DHS’s Open Government webpage touts that 
“[s]ince August 2009, the Department has released/posted approximately 
700 documents to its FOIA reading rooms.”46
B. Local Enforcement of Immigration Law and 
the Backdrop for Secure Communities
The history of immigration enforcement in the United States, and 
particularly the relationship and power-sharing between local and 
federal governments, is a complex and nuanced area of law that this 
Article does not attempt to detail fully. The purpose of this Part is to 
provide a brief background on the federalist structure of immigration 
enforcement that provides a backdrop for Secure Communities. This 
allows for greater insight into the constitutional controversy that made 
the information gleaned through NDLON’s FOIA request so important.
Early in American history, states took a more active role in creating 
and enacting immigration laws, for instance, by establishing their own 
entry requirements and health restrictions.47 These laws provide the 
basis for the “inherent authority” theory of state enforcement, which 
suggests that states have inherent power as sovereigns to implement 
and enforce immigration laws.48 During the latter part of the 19th 
century, however, the federal government began to assert a plenary 
power over immigration by passing substantive immigration laws.49 
In 1889, the now-famous Chinese Exclusion Case held that the federal 
45 See Celebrating FOIA’s Forty-Fifth Anniversary and Assessing This Past Year’s Progress in 
Implementing Attorney General Holder’s FOIA Guidelines, Dep’t of Justice, http://www.foia.
gov/2011foiapost26.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) [hereinafter FOIA’s Forty-Fifth Anniversary] 
(providing an overview on agencies’ progress implementing President Obama’s mandate and 
concluding that “[t]his assessment illustrates that all the Departments have taken multiple, 
concrete steps in all five of the key areas to implement the FOIA Guidelines.”).
46 Dep’t of Homeland Sec, Transparency at the Department of Homeland Security (Sept. 29, 2012, 4:50 
PM), http://www.dhs.gov/transparency.
47 See Jayesh Rathod, Speech on Local Enforcement of Immigration Law at the American University 
Washington College of Law Summer Institute on Law and Government (June 28, 2011) (discussing 
the common misunderstanding that immigration enforcement has always existed exclusively at 
the federal level); see also Michael J. Wishnie, “State and Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws,” 
Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 928, available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/928/ 
(“In the early years of the nation, there was little federal regulation of immigration . . . .”). 
48 For a criticism of this position, see generally Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent 
Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws violates the Constitution, 31 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 965, 967 (2004) (arguing that the inherent authority position is indefensible 
because conflicts with the constitutional mandate for uniform enforcement of immigration laws 
and undermines cohesive foreign policy). See also Greg K. Venbrux, Devolution or Evolution: The 
Increasing Role of the State in Immigration Law Enforcement, 11 U.C.L.A. J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 
307, 314–21 (2008) (discussing the increasing role of local and state governments in immigration 
enforcement and the DOJ’s inconsistent application of the “inherent authority” theory).
49 See Cong. Budget Office, Immigration Policy in the United States 1 (2006), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7051/02-28-immigration.pdf (discussing 
the passage of the first substantive immigration law in 1875, which barred immigrants who were 
considered to be “undesirable,” such as prostitutes).
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government’s ability to exclude foreigners is “an incident of sover-
eignty” under the U.S. Constitution.50 The constitutional basis for federal 
power over immigration law is often cited as the combined authority 
under the Naturalization Clause,51 the Foreign Affairs Clauses,52 and the 
Commerce Clause.53 Some argue that these constitutional provisions, 
particularly when coupled with the Supremacy Clause,54 enable the fed-
eral government to preempt state immigration enforcement altogether.55 
The recent Supreme Court case, Arizona v. United States, affirmed that the 
primacy of federal authority over immigration law is “well-settled” and 
struck down provisions of an Arizona immigration statute that autho-
rized independent immigration enforcement action by local police.56 In 
its decision, the Court discussed at length the legal and policy reasons 
for the federal government’s expansive immigration power.57
Although the current landscape of immigration law appears to 
reject the “inherent authority” theory for states, Congress has delegated 
certain immigration functions to states by statute.58 For example, the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) autho-
rizes states to detain previously removed immigrants.59 The same year 
it enacted the AEDPA, Congress also passed the Illegal Immigration 
50 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The 
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of 
the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, the right to its 
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require 
it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.”).
51 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress “to establish an uniform rule of 
Naturalization . . . throughout the United States”).
52 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (Congress’ power to declare war); id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (Senate’s power  
to advise and consent to the appointment of ambassadors); id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (President’s  
power to make treaties, with the advice and consent of the senate). 
53 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations . . .”).
54 Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
55 See Pham, supra note 48, at 987 (examining each of the pertinent constitutional provisions  
in detail as support against the “inherent authority” position and arguing in favor of exclusive 
federal control over immigration power for both legal and policy reasons).
56 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2496 (2012) (“Federal law specifies limited 
circumstances in which state officers may perform an immigration officer’s functions . . . .  
And it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens  
in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision.”).
57 Id. at 2498 (“Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations 
for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek 
the full protection of its laws.”).
58 But see John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Prepared Remarks on the National Security EntryExit 
Registration System (June 6, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speec
hes/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm) (providing a rare unpublished government endorsement 
of the inherent authority position shortly after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft noted, “The Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has concluded that this narrow, limited mission that we are 
asking state and local police to undertake voluntarily—arresting aliens who have violated criminal 
provisions of Immigration and Nationality Act or civil provisions that render an alien deportable, 
and who are listed on the NCIC — is within the inherent authority of the states.”).
59 Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 439, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),60 which 
provided that, in the circumstance of a “mass influx” of immigrants, 
local police have the power to make arrests.61 IIRIRA also established 
legal mechanisms for the Attorney General to delegate immigration 
enforcement authority to local police.62 Codified under section 287(g) 
of the INA, this provision has formed the basis for one of the broad-
est initiatives to incorporate local police into immigration enforcement 
through so-called “287(g) agreements.”63 These agreements provide 
LEAs the opportunity to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with 
DHS wherein local officers are deputized as ICE agents and trained 
to enforce immigration law.64 Section 287(g) has facilitated sixty-eight 
active agreements with DHS in twenty-four states.65
Up until and including the implementation of 287(g) agreements, 
the involvement of LEAs in immigration enforcement was always 
framed as voluntary.66 Grounded, in part, in the Tenth Amendment,67 
the doctrine outlined in Printz v. United States68 and New York v. United 
States69 provides that the federal government may not commandeer 
60 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 287 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
61 See id. at § 372(8) (“In the event the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent 
mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States, or near a land border, presents 
urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response, the Attorney General may 
authorize any State or local law enforcement officer, with the consent of the head of the 
department, agency, or establishment under whose jurisdiction the individual is serving, to 
perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this Act or 
regulations issued thereunder upon officers or employees of the Service.”).
62 See id. at § 287(g) (“The Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, 
or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or 
subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of 
an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the 
United States.”)
63 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., The Performance of 287(g) Agreements, Office of the 
Inspector General (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-
63_Mar10.pdf; see generally Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) 
Immigration and Nationality Act, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/
news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
64 Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE’s 287(g) Program, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-reform.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Pham, supra note 48, at 976–77 (noting that initiatives that implicate local police in 
immigration enforcement “must be structured as an invitation to local law enforcement to pass 
Tenth Amendment muster”).
67 U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,  
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people.”).
68 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring 
the states to address particular problems, nor command State’s officers or those of political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce federal regulatory program.”).
69 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (finding that the history of the Constitutional Convention supports the 
conclusion that “Congress may not commandeer the States’ legislative processes by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, but must exercise legislative 
authority directly upon individuals”).
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state machinery to administer federal laws.70 A few congressional 
attempts to encroach on this territory in immigration law failed. For 
example, in 2003, and again in 2005, the House proposed the “Clear 
Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act” (CLEAR Act).71 
This legislation sought to give local law enforcement officers the 
authority to enforce federal immigration laws through incentivized 
state and local participation.72 A Senate proposal called the “Homeland 
Security Enforcement Act” (HSEA) would have implemented similar 
measures.73 These bills pushed constitutional boundaries because they 
would have imposed rigid appropriation disincentives for non-compli-
ance that many felt overstepped commandeering boundaries.74 Neither 
of these pieces of legislation succeeded.75
C. The Structure of Secure Communities
Secure Communities was not explicitly created by an act of 
Congress, and is not governed by any DHS regulations.76 DHS has 
asserted that its legal authority to implement Secure Communities is 
found in Congress’s broadly worded instruction that DHS target and 
remove criminal aliens. This direct mandate appeared in 2008 when 
the Budget Appropriations Committee instructed DHS to prioritize 
developing strategies to “improve and modernize efforts to identify 
aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment, and who may 
be deportable, and remove them from the United States once they are 
70 This doctrine applies to the immigration context. See Daniel Booth, Federalism on ICE: State and 
Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1063, 1075 (2006) (“Given 
the relatively robust anti-commandeering doctrine expressed in Printz and New York, it does not 
appear that there could be an ‘emergency exception’ to the general rule. Moreover, even if there 
were such a rule or exception, local enforcement of immigration law does not rise to the level of  
an emergency in which such an exception would apply.”).
71 See Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003).
72 Id.
73 Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 2003, S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003). 
74 The 2005 version of the CLEAR Act legislation stated that LEAs “have the inherent 
authority of a sovereign entity to investigate, identify, apprehend, detain or transfer to Federal 
custody aliens in the United States” but that any state which “has in effect a statute, policy, 
or practice that prohibits law enforcement officers . . . from assisting or cooperating with 
Federal immigration law enforcement . . . shall not receive certain funding.” H.R. 3137, 109th 
Cong. §§ 2–3(a) (2005). For additional discussion on this legislation, see Booth, supra note 70 at 
1075−81 (discussing whether funding incentives constitute federal coercion to the point that the 
commandeering doctrine is implicated).
75 Id.
76 National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Agency (ICE), Center for Constitutional Rights, http://www.ccrjustice.org/secure-communities 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2012) (observing that “no regulations have been promulgated”) [hereinafter 
NDLON v. ICE Synopsis].
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judged deportable.”77 Further, in addition to general provisions of the 
U.S. Code that give DHS the power to identify and detain criminal 
aliens,78 the most pertinent provision of DHS’s enabling statute requires 
it “to make available, daily (on a 24-hour basis), to Federal, State, and 
local authorities the investigative resources of the Service to deter-
mine whether individuals arrested by such authorities for aggravated 
felonies are aliens.”79
The explicit mandate for the creation of Secure Communities is 
rooted in the Bush Administration’s Presidential Directive-24, which 
instructed DHS to streamline its efforts with numerous other federal 
agencies to aggregate and share biometric data of “persons who may 
pose a threat to national security.”80 The directive required agencies to 
concretely identify strategies for collecting and comparing biometric 
information and report back to the President with a cohesive program 
within one year.81
In response to this executive and legislative guidance, DHS devel-
oped Secure Communities to be a program that, unlike past legislation, 
utilizes new technology that merges fingerprint identification into one 
step and does not require deputizing or providing significant training to 
local law enforcement.82 Secure Communities does not authorize local 
police to enforce immigration laws and, on its face, does not authorize 
local law enforcement to inquire about a person’s immigration status or 
take action based on a suspicion that the person does not have lawful a 
immigration status.83 Describing the program as a “technology-centric” 
77 H.R. 2764 § 2 (requiring that DHS, as part of that initiative, “present a strategy for U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement to identify every criminal alien, at the prison, jail, or 
correctional institution in which they are held” and that DHS “shall report to the Committees 
on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, at least quarterly, on 
progress implementing the expenditure plan”). For additional information on the background 
of Secure Communities, see generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-708, SECURE 
COMMUNITIES: Criminal Alien Removals Increased, but Technology Planning Improvements 
Needed (2012) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A Comprehensive 
Plan to Identify and Removal Criminal Aliens (July 21, 2009), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf (a revised version of DHS’s original 
2008 strategic plan).
78 See Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement And [State Identification Bureau], supra note 12 (asserting that DHS’s 
authority to implement Secure Communities is grounded in the following provisions which 
generally discuss the agency’s power to identify and remove criminal aliens: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),  
8 U.S.C. § 1226(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1228, and 8 U.S.C. § 1105).
79 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d)(1)(a).
80 See Homeland Security Presidential Directive-24, supra note 10. 
81 See id. 
82 See Immigration and Customs Enforcement, What Law Enforcement Needs to Know: Secure 
Communities Briefing #1, YouTube (June 11, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUdeqg5TpHA.
83 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Get the Facts, available at http://www.ice.gov/secure_
communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (“Under Secure Communities, state 
and local law enforcement officers are not deputized, do not enforce immigration law, and are not 
tasked with any additional responsibilities.”).
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rather than “agent-centric” strategy,84 ICE responded to congressional 
concerns about the involvement of agents by stating that the new bio-
metrics technology eliminates the burden and discretion that 287(g) 
agreements place on officers.85
Secure Communities technology is utilized when a law enforcement 
officer submits a request to the FBI fingerprint database, pursuant to 
standard arrest protocol.86 Once the fingerprints are received by the 
FBI fingerprint database, it automatically searches the individual’s 
immigration history as well.87 The database then delivers the result of 
the inquiry to local law enforcement.88 If there is a match indicating 
that the arrested immigrant is removable, ICE investigates the immi-
grant’s status and determines whether to issue a detainer.89 ICE is then 
responsible for taking the immigrant into custody, though local law 
enforcement often aids ICE by keeping the individual detained and 
completing appropriate paperwork.90
Secure Communities training materials indicate that it prioritizes 
certain groups of criminal aliens based on the “levels” of threat posed 
by the offender.91 For example, “Level 1” includes “individuals who 
have been convicted of major drug offenses, national security crimes, 
and violent crimes such as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and 
kidnapping.”92 Levels 2 and 3 target lesser offenses.93 ICE maintains 
that it uses this grading system as a framework for determining 
whether to take an immigrant into custody.94 As of June 30, 2012, 
84 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security 111th Cong., 971 (2009) [hereinafter 2010 Appropriations Hearing] (statement by Michael 
Aytes, Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)).
85 2010 Appropriations Hearing, 976 (statement of David Venturella, Executive Director of Secure 
Communities) (responding to an inquiry about whether the program would involve “relying a lot 
on the local communities” by saying that, unlike the old model, “the new model does not rely on 
them making a judgment on the individual’s immigration status”).
86 This database is called the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). See 
Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement And [State Identification Bureau], supra note 12 at 3. The DHS database is 
called the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (“US-VISIT”) 
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Secure Communities has resulted in the removal of 151,000 criminal 
aliens from the United States.95
Like 287(g), Secure Communities engages localities in immigration 
enforcement, but the Secure Communities technology is arguably 
distinguishable because it automatically transmits fingerprint data from 
DHS headquarters, and the local agent only has control over whether 
to view the response.96 When questioned by Congress about whether 
DHS would activate the technology without the state or locality’s 
consent, ICE stated: “. . . the local law enforcement officials, as well 
as local governments, can opt out of participating in this type of pro-
gram. So it is not a mandatory program, it is certainly voluntary.”97 This 
congressional testimony quelled concerns about unconstitutional state 
commandeering and distinguished the program from more controver-
sial programs, including the 2003 and 2005 legislation that had proposed 
integrating LEAs with federal enforcement of immigration law.98
II. FOIA in DHS’s Secure Communities
A. The Role of FOIA in Secure Communities
Shortly after the implementation of Secure Communities, commu-
nity advocates, state officials, and the public began to inquire about 
the details of the program. The media highlighted concerns about the 
burden that Secure Communities would place on local law enforce-
ment and the reality that, although the program purports to target 
criminal aliens who have been convicted of the most serious crimes, 
many immigrants arrested for minor crimes have also been detained.99 
Stakeholders also voiced concerns about racial profiling, wherein 
95 Secure Communities, Immigration & Customs Enforcement (last visited Sept. 8, 2012 8:10 PM), 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (“Through June 30, 2012, more than 151,000 immigrants 
convicted of crimes, including more than 55,000 convicted of aggravated felony (level 1) offenses 
like murder, rape and the sexual abuse of children were removed from the United States after 
identification through Secure Communities.”).
96 2010 Appropriations Hearing, 977 (statement of David Venturella, Executive Director, Secure 
Communities) (“Local law enforcement has always had the ability to initiate an immigration query 
through a telecommunications system. What we are doing now is we are integrating the two 
databases, and part of the booking process . . . So, they do not have to do a second query, they  
do not have to initiate a second. It is all part of the booking process.”).
97 Id.
98 See footnotes and surrounding text supra notes 71–75.
99 See Immigr. and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities, IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability, 
Monthly Statistics through April 30, 2011, § 2, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-
stats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-feb28.pdf (reporting that ICE has detained 75,104 
non-criminal immigrants since the program began in 2008); see also Julia Preston, States Resisting 
Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy, N.Y Times (May 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/05/-06/-us-/-06immigration.html (“Some state officials, led by Governor Quinn, said  
the program was not accomplishing its stated goal of deporting convicted criminals, but had  
swept up many immigrants who were here illegally but had not been convicted of any crime.”).
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officers arrest individuals for alleged crimes knowing that the criminal 
charges will likely be dismissed, but the person will nonetheless be 
detained by DHS.100 By far the most heated public debate concerned 
questions about whether the program was voluntary and,101 despite 
DHS’s assurances to Congress, its public messages began to waver from 
the clear statement that the program is “certainly voluntary.”102 Reports 
that states could not opt out emerged from sources like “[a] senior ICE 
official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not 
authorized to talk about the involuntary nature of the program,” who 
suggested that, because Secure Communities is predicated on infor-
mation-sharing between federal agencies, the agencies intended to 
continue collecting data notwithstanding state opposition.103 A media 
frenzy ensued when Janet Napolitano reportedly stated in an October 
2010 public appearance, “We don’t consider Secure Communities an 
100 See Julian Aguilar, With Clock Ticking, Immigration Bills in Limbo, The Tex. Trib. (May 23, 
2011), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-legislature/82nd-legislative-session/with-clock-
ticking-immigration-bills-in-limbo/ (reporting on a debate in the Texas state legislature about 
whether to pass a bill making Secure Communities mandatory, and quoting a letter from the 
House Democrats stating, “We have concerns about racially profiling our citizens under the 
guise of cracking down on so-called ‘sanctuary cities.’ There is a tremendous risk that such 
legislation would inadvertently target legal citizens of Texas, solely because they fall within 
a certain ethnic demographic. As we are all well aware, racial profiling is illegal in Texas.”); 
Burke, Secure Communities or Racial Profiling?, Colo. Connection (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.
coloradoconnection.com/news/story.aspx?id=581473; Karen Lee Ziner, R.I. Critics Say Secure 
Communities Invites Racial Profiling, Providence J. (June 12, 2011), http://www.projo.com/news/
content/SCOMM_PROTESTS_06-12-11_6JOIUON_v38.29638ff.html. 
101 See Afton Branche, Can Cities Really Opt Out of Secure Communities, Huffington Post 
(Sept. 2, 2010, 11:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/afton-branche/can-cities-really-
opt-out_b_703431.html; Suzanne Gamboa, “voluntary” Immigration Program Not So voluntary, 
Associated Press (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41625585/ns/us_news-security/t/
voluntary-immigration-program-not-so-voluntary/ (“A voluntary program to run all criminal 
suspects’ fingerprints through an immigration database was only voluntary until cities refused 
to participate, recently released documents show.”); Ruxandra Guidi, KPBS Radio (June 20, 
2011), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/jun/20/secure-communities-program-comes-under-fire/ 
(interviewing Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director John Morton’s on KPCC Public 
Radio in Los Angeles, where he said, “An individual state can’t come to the federal government 
and say, ‘we don’t want the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security 
to share information or seek to prevent that information sharing.’ That is between federal 
departments”); Mallie Jane Kim, Controversial Immigration Program Spurs Federal-State Spat, 
U.S. News & World Rep. (June 27, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/06/27/
controversial-immigration-program-spurs-federal-state-spat; Press Release, The Center for 
Constitutional Rights, New Document Confirms Secure Communities Program is Voluntary, 
Rights Groups Say ICE Must Allow Counties to Opt-Out (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.
commondreams.org/newswire/2010/09/01-8 (“We have known all along that S-Comm is a 
voluntary program because it is a program, not a federal law.”).
102 See supra text surrounding notes 96–97.
103 Shankar Vendantam, No Opt-Out for Immigration Enforcement, Washington Post (Oct. 1, 
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/30/AR2010093007268.
html?sid=ST2010122004569.
118 Unlocking Secure Communities
opt in/opt out program.”104 Confusion about the program led several 
states to resist implementation, and a few to announce that they 
intended to refuse participation altogether.105
As the public searched for information about Secure Communities, 
DHS’s website remained incomplete, abstract, and even seemed contra-
dictory. For instance, the “Get the Facts” webpage included data about 
the program’s efficiency and statistics tallying the removals of criminal 
aliens effectuated through the program, but did not include key “facts” 
like information on the functionality of the technology.106 Even as news 
that states could not opt out trickled to the public, documents suggest-
ing just the opposite remained on DHS’s website, including a sample 
Memorandum of Understanding suggesting an “agreement” between 
local police and DHS to operate Secure Communities and a “Setting 
the Record Straight” document that described the steps for opting 
out.107 Further, in a separate area of DHS’s website that is not linked to 
the Secure Communities page, DHS posted a section of ICE’s proac-
tive disclosures, which included documents like the 2009 Standard 
Operating Procedures, the 2009 Strategic Plan, the 2009 Appropriation 
Utilization Plan, and a document containing Secure Communities 
presentations.108 These documents, which are still the only content on 
Secure Communities on ICE’s proactive disclosures webpage, pro-
vide general information about the program, but do not resolve the 
104 See, e.g., Zoe Lofgren: DHS May Have Misled Public On Immigration Program, Huffington Post 
(Apr. 28, 2011, 6:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/28/lofgren-calls-for-dhs-
investigation_n_855138.html.
105 See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, States Rebel Over Deportations, Wall St. J. Digital Network, (May 14, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704681904576321404203166580.html.
106 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Get the Facts, available at http://www.ice.gov/
secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
107 FOIA Proactive Disclosures, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/foia/
proactive.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2012) and click on “Secure Communities- Memorandums of 
Agreement”; Elise Foley, Opting Out of Immigration Enforcement, The Washington Independent 
(Sept. 1, 2010), http://washingtonindependent.com/96472/opting-out-of-immigration-enforcement 
(“On a conference call today, advocacy groups criticized the opt-out process delineated in a Aug. 17 
[2010] ICE document called ‘Setting the Record Straight.’ The paragraph-long set of instructions for 
opting out should have been released sooner and more widely, critics of Secure Communities say.); 
Elise Foley, Document on Opting Out of Immigration Enforcement Program Mysteriously Disappears, The 
Washington Independent (Oct. 20, 2010), http://washingtonindependent.com/101243/document-on-
opting-out-of-immigration-enforcement-program-mysteriously-disappears (“An Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement spokeswoman said not to read too much into it, but the August document 
listing steps for communities to opt out of the Secure Communities program seems to have 
disappeared from the ICE website.”). In the wake of the controversy, ICE brushed aside suggestions 
that the “Setting the Record Straight” document’s disappearance was significant, and media reported 
that “ICE launched a new website today, and ICE spokeswoman Cori Bassett said it is possible 
the document was lost in the shuffle and will reappear later.” Id. The “Setting the Record Straight” 
document never reappeared, but was previously available at: http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure_
communities/pdf/sc-setting_the_record_straight.pdf.
108 FOIA Proactive Disclosures, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/foia/
proactive.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
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main questions posed by the public regarding “opt-out” provisions or 
racial profiling, nor do they provide current information on up-to-date 
appropriations.
In an effort to learn more about Secure Communities,109 on 
February 3, 2010, NDLON, CCR, and the Immigration Justice Clinic 
of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law110 (together the NDLON 
Requesters) filed a FOIA request with ICE.111 The request sought a vari-
ety of records, including training materials, public speeches, coordination 
documents, documents pertaining to potential racial profiling, statistical 
data, and demographic data on immigrants removed under the pro-
gram.112 After receiving no response, on April 27, 2010, the requesters 
filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York seeking access to internal records on the program.113 
The complaint observed that “[d]espite the immense scale of Secure 
Communities, ICE has released little information about it to the pub-
lic. The limited information available is vague and conflicting” and 
asserted that disclosure was necessary to “facilitate meaningful public 
discourse and increase government transparency.”114 The NDLON 
Requesters further argued that disclosure would “vindicate the pub-
lic’s right to information about practices and policies relating to the 
ongoing implementation and expansion of Secure Communities.”115 
On August 2, 2010,116 DHS began to release documents in response to 
the complaint but, throughout the litigation, disputes have arisen over 
the timing, substance, and manner of DHS’s disclosures.
With regard to the timing of disclosures, the plaintiffs claimed 
that the request required expedited processing because of the “com-
pelling need” for the information under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I). 
A “compelling need” is established when there is “urgency to inform 
the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity,” 
when the requester is a “person primarily engaged in disseminating 
information,”117 and also when there is “a matter of widespread and 
109 The request stated, “The purpose of this request is to obtain information for the public 
about the Secure Communities program and its impact on the relationship between local law 
enforcement and immigration enforcement in local communities. This information will enable the 
public to monitor the impact of the program.” Kessler, supra note 14 at 1.
110 The firm Mayer Brown, LLP began to assist the plaintiffs with the project in Fall 2010. See 
NDLON v. ICE Synopsis, supra note 76.
111 See NDLON v. ICE Synopsis supra note 76.
112 Bridget Kessler, supra note 14.
113 Complaint for Plaintiff, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
Agency, 10 CIV. 3488 SAS, 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011) withdrawn per order from the court 




116 NDLON v. ICE Synopsis, supra note 76.
117 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv).
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exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about 
the government’s integrity which affect public confidence.”118 The 
NDLON Requesters claimed that the broad scope of the program and 
significant resources devoted to its implementation justified release of 
the data.119 The court agreed and ordered ICE to release a small portion 
of the most urgent records due to the “compelling need” for release.120
With regard to the substance of disclosures, DHS employed sev-
eral strategies aimed at retaining or limiting the information disclosed, 
including invoking several FOIA exemptions. For instance, it invoked 
FOIA Exemption 2, which protects from disclosure information that 
pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an 
agency,121 and includes documents “used for predominantly internal 
purposes.”122 DHS also claimed that Exemption 7(E) under FOIA also 
applied because release of the information would disclose procedures 
for law enforcement investigations,123 which includes law enforcement 
techniques.124 Additionally, DHS invoked FOIA’s Exemption 5, which 
effectively invokes the deliberative process privilege.125 This exemption 
applies to agency memoranda that could not normally be viewed by 
people outside of the government unless through litigation discovery 
techniques. Generally, the court permitted ICE to redact a portion of 
118 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(ii). 
119 The request read: “[T]here is an urgent need to inform the public of the Secure Communities 
program. 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv). The Fiscal Year 2010 appropriations bill for DHS allocates 
$200 billion to Secure Communities. To date, the program has been implemented in over 95 
jurisdictions in eleven states. By 2013, ICE intends to operate the program in all 3,100 county and 
local jails across the country. In spite of this widespread fiscal and community impact, ICE has 
promulgated no regulations or agency guidelines . . . [it has] not released the memorandums 
of agreement that it has entered into with local entities or disclosed precisely how Secure 
Communities will be implemented on a local level [and] the public has an urgent need to 
understand the scope of the program.” Bridget Kessler, supra note 14 at 1.
120 See Stipulation and Order, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
Agency, 10 CIV. 3488 SAS, 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011) withdrawn per order from the court 
June 17, 2011, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Exemptions-Decision.pdf (published online by 
NDLON).
121 See Freedom of Information Act § 552(b)(2). 
122 Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
123 Freedom of Information Act § 552(b)(7)(E) (exempting from disclosure “records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such 
law enforcement records or information . . . would disclose techniques and procedures for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law”).
124 See Smith v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 977 F. Supp. 496, 501 (D.D.C. 1997).
125 Freedom of Information Act § 552(b)(5).
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the documents, but required it to release the segregable remainder.126 
In its order, the court explicitly noted DHS’s inconsistent messaging 
on Secure Communities and, with regard to whether state participa-
tion was voluntary, observed that DHS “appeared to reverse course” 
during the pendency of the litigation.127 The court found that DHS’s 
invocation of these exemptions was in many cases unjustified, noting, 
for instance, that its reliance on Exemption 5’s deliberative process 
privilege was unfounded when documents did “not contain agency 
deliberations about what Secure Communities policies should be, but 
rather about what message should be delivered to the public about 
what Secure Communities policies are . . . . [which] are the sorts of 
discussions that FOIA is intended to reveal.”128 The order asserted that 
an agency’s efforts to conceal such information are “anathema to the 
operation of democratic government.”129
An additional substantive dispute emerged surrounding the search 
techniques that DHS used to gather documents, including whose 
records should be searched and what keywords DHS should employ 
to perform the electronic searches.130 In its July 13, 2012 order, the court 
noted its difficulty in assessing the adequacy of a search, but empha-
sized the importance of designing precise research strategies, includ-
ing thoughtfully constructed search terms with appropriate Boolean 
connectors.131 The court instructed the parties to work cooperatively 
to design searches that would most effectively aggregate the data that 
should be disclosed under FOIA.132
Another litigation dispute arose regarding the manner of ICE’s doc-
ument disclosure. 133 Initially, ICE released the first group of records as 
one large electronic file, which was not searchable and made it unclear 
126 See July 11, 2011 Opinion and Order, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement Agency, 10 CIV. 3488 SAS, 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011) withdrawn per 
order from the court June 17, 2011, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Exemptions-Decision.
pdf (published online by NDLON) (detailing the exemptions claimed by DHS and the court’s 
decision).
127 Id. at 4–6.
128 Id. at 29 (emphasis in original).
129 Id. at 31.
130 See generally July 13, 2012 Opinion and Order, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement Agency, 10 CIV. 3488 SAS, 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011) 
withdrawn per order from the court June 17, 2011, available http://ccrjustice.org/files/7-13-12%20
AOS%20Opinion.pdf (published online by the FOIA requesters).
131 Id. at 39–40.
132 Id. at 44–45.
133 Mayer Brown Exposes Controversy Surrounding Secure Communities in FOIA Litigation, 
Mayer Brown, LLP (June 13, 2011), http://www.mayerbrown.com/probono/news/article.
asp?id=11130&nid=291 (“When the government first released its records, the documents were 
produced in one large electronic file, rendering them unsearchable. The records were also devoid 
of intrinsic electronic information (metadata) critical to identifying, indexing and searching files in 
an effective manner. . . Mayer Brown obtained an order holding that certain metadata is, indeed, 
an integral part of an electronic record and “readily reproducible” in the FOIA context.”).
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when one document ended and another began.134 ICE also removed 
all metadata, which made it difficult for the viewer to determine the 
dates and agency officials responsible for generating it. Based on the 
FOIA requirement that documents be released in “any form or format 
requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the 
agency,”135 the court held that DHS had to reproduce the documents in 
a manageable format together with metadata.136
Despite these withholdings, by the third disclosure in June 2011, 
DHS had complied with several court orders and had released thou-
sands of pages of records on the program. After NDLON published 
the records online, the public was able to access documents that shed 
light on the controversy surrounding the program. Media, civil society 
organizations, and the interested public seized upon newfound access 
and began to meaningfully scrutinize the program for the first time.137 
The documents released included redacted e-mails between Secure 
Communities staff and members of Congress about the “opt-out” pro-
visions, internal documents that provided detail on the structure and 
logistics of the program, as well as documents that connected Secure 
Communities with a larger FBI initiative. Among the most revealing 
documents were e-mails that chronicled the internal agency incon-
sistency surrounding the program, including one widely publicized 
e-mail in which a staffer, whose name was redacted, wrote: “I’m totally 
confused now. I’ve got so many versions of the opt-out language I don’t 
know what’s current and what’s not. It seems like we’ve got different 
language for different purposes, and it’s confusing.”138 By equipping 
the public with this information about Secure Communities, including 
the internal agency inconsistency, the release of the FOIA documents 
134 Id. 
135 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B).
136 See Opinion and Order, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
Agency, 10 CIV. 3488 SAS, 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011) withdrawn per order from the court 
June 17, 2011, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Exemptions-Decision.pdf (published online by 
NDLON) (detailing the exemptions claimed by DHS and detailed in the court’s decision).
137 See Alfonso Chardy, FBI Joins Effort to Identify Undocumented Aliens, Miami Herald (July 
7, 2011), reprinted at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/07/08/v-print/117232/fbi-joins-effort-
to-identify-undocumented.html; Rina Palta, A FOIA Brings in Data on Secure Communities, 
KALW News (Aug, 10, 2010), http://informant.kalwnews.org/2010/08/a-foia-brings-in-data-
on-secure-communities/; Marcos Restrepo, Newly Released Documents Shed Light on FBI’s Role 
in Secure Communities, Fla. Independent (July 6, 2011), http://floridaindependent.com/38178/
fbi-secure-communities.
138 Michele Waslin, New DHS Documents Highlight Internal Confusion About Secure Communities 
Program, Immigration Impact (Feb. 23, 2011), http://immigrationimpact.com/2011/02/23/
new-dhs-documents-highlight-internal-confusion-over-secure-communities-program/.
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caused a sea change in public discourse, participation, and even state 
and local decision making.139
After the FOIA documents became public, DHS also took several 
affirmative steps to address concerns, including explicitly apologizing 
for its misleading statements.140 For instance, DHS’s Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) created an online system to handle civil 
rights complaints relating to Secure Communities, such as complaints 
regarding racial profiling, and also enhanced its oversight through sta-
tistical analysis of immigrants detained under Secure Communities.141 
To address the “confusion about how Secure Communities works and 
who is required to participate that had been created by certain ICE 
statements,” the Secretary of Homeland Security commissioned a task 
force comprised of individuals from diverse fields that held town hall 
meetings nationwide.142 The task force made findings on issues like 
“Misunderstandings Regarding the Secure Communities and the Role 
of Local Law Enforcement Agencies” and “Perceived Inconsistencies 
between Secure Communities’ Stated Goals and Outcomes.”143 It rec-
ommended that “ICE must improve the transparency of the program,” 
and ICE responded by expanding the information available on its web-
site.144 For example, the “Get the Facts” section now includes the clear 
statement: “FACT: State and local jurisdictions cannot opt out of Secure 
Communities.”145 Further, senior ICE Officers also granted requests to 
meet with media and advocacy organizations to discuss the program 
139 See, e.g., Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy, N.Y 
Times, (May 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06immigration.html (“This year, 
the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, an immigrant advocate organization, obtained 
a trove of e-mails and other internal documents concerning Secure Communities from the 
immigration agency through a Freedom of Information request. After examining those documents, 
Ms. Lofgren and Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, also a Democrat, demanded that 
the homeland security inspector general open an investigation. Ms. Lofgren said officials had 
deliberately misled local governments into thinking they could choose to opt out of the program. 
‘I believe that some false and misleading statements may have been made intentionally, while 
others were made recklessly,’ Mr. Lofgren [the top-ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary 
Immigration Subcommittee] wrote the inspector general.
In an apologetic response, Mr. Morton, the head of the immigration agency, said the agency ‘takes 
full responsibility for the confusion and inconsistent statements’ about participation.’”).
140 Id.
141 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secure Communities (June 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/secure-
communities (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
142 ICE Office of the Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Response to the 
Task Force on Secure Communities Findings and Recommendations 2 (2012).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 4–5 (“ICE . . . has recently updated the ICE.gov Secure Communities webpage at http://
www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ to provide additional transparency and increased information 
sharing. These updates include information on how Secure Communities works, frequently asked 
questions, new ICE policies, the Secure Communities complaint protocol, and briefing materials 
for state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs).”).
145 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Get the Facts, available at http://www.ice.gov/
secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
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in an effort to explain perceived inconsistencies, thus imposing a level 
of accountability on ICE that had not been previously possible.146 In 
its July 13, 2012 ruling in the NDLON case, the court observed that 
“[t]his litigation has influenced much of the public debate over Secure 
Communities.”147
B. Problems with the Role of FOIA in Secure Communities
For Secure Communities, the NDLON FOIA litigation was the gate-
way to public awareness and involvement. Not only did it lead to the 
release of documents that gave the public previously unavailable insight 
into the program, but it also acted as a catalyst for the agency to engage 
the public and release more information. The NDLON Court observed 
that, because the FOIA litigation significantly increased public access 
to information on Secure Communities, “[t]he Act has therefore 
served its purpose of engendering a more informed public and a more 
accountable government.”148 Though in many ways the NDLON case is 
a FOIA success story, there are many drawbacks to FOIA that are also 
exemplified by the role of FOIA in Secure Communities.
Most prominently, large agencies rarely respond to FOIA requests 
promptly and, even in the case of the highly publicized Secure 
Communities FOIA litigation, many months passed before significant 
documents were released. The nine FOIA exemptions and evolving 
case law regarding the manner of record release provided further 
opportunities for the agency to resist disclosure or cause delay.149 As 
months passed and DHS continued to withhold records, journalists 
and civil society organizations grappled for information on Secure 
Communities, and speculation lead to heavily sensationalized media 
146 See Daniel Denvir, Ice Takes Heat for Deportation Plan, Guardian.Co.UK (June 6, 2011), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/06/usimmigration-obama-administration 
(reporting that “Ice [sic] says that President Obama’s signature immigration enforcement 
programme (begun under Bush) is mandatory – after spending three years telling activists, elected 
officials and law enforcement officials that it was optional” and quoting ICE spokesman Harold 
Ort as saying “Secure Communities is not voluntary and never has been . . . As we have noted 
before, unfortunately, this was not communicated as clearly as it should have been to state and 
local jurisdictions by Ice when the programme began.”); ICE Office of the Director, Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, ICE Response to the Task Force on Secure Communities Findings 
and Recommendations, 4 (2012) (“ICE has also expanded outreach efforts with key stakeholders 
at the national, state and local levels, involving both government offices and community groups. 
During calendar year 2011, ICE conducted more than 730 in-person or telephonic meetings and 
presentations regarding Secure Communities with various LEAs, the general public, congressional 
representatives, immigration advocates, and foreign embassy representatives . . . .”). 
147 July 13, 2012 Opinion and Order, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement Agency, 10 CIV. 3488 SAS, 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011) withdrawn per order 
from the court June 17, 2011, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/7-13-12%20AOS%20Opinion.pdf 
(published online by NDLON).
148 Id. at 3.
149 See supra notes 117–37 and accompanying text.
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coverage, including rumors about purposeful cover-up of evidence, 
and conspiracy.150 Even though DHS’s Inspector General found no 
evidence of bad faith by DHS,151 and DHS has sought to improve trans-
parency and public awareness in recent months, some have suggested 
that the damage to the public’s trust is irreparable. One state lawmaker 
noted, “Whatever faith the community had in this out-of-control agen-
cy’s ability to police itself is now permanently broken.”152 A California 
bill intended to limit the effect of Secure Communities is known as 
the “TRUST Act” — another not-so-subtle indication of the public’s 
continued sense of betrayal.153 DHS is not unique, however, and many 
agencies have notoriously long wait times for information, with some 
requests taking ten or more years to be completed.154 Commenting on 
the FOIA delays government-wide, one researcher in a 2007 study 
quipped “sunlight is the best disinfectant, but this kind of inexcusable 
delay by federal agencies just keeps us in the dark.”155
Additionally, even if an agency fulfills a FOIA request in a timely 
manner, the information will only become available after the agency 
has implemented the policy. DHS did not disclose substantial records 
on Secure Communities until it was faced with litigation over a FOIA 
request, which occurred long after the implementation of Secure 
Communities was well underway. Further, DHS has continued to move 
forward with its plan to activate every jurisdiction in the United States 
by 2013, even though the litigation is still ongoing.156 Consequently, 
the public almost played no role in the deliberation, evaluation, or 
150 See, e.g., Feds Stall Release of Records for Controversial Immigration Enforcement Program, 
Deportation Nation (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.deportationnation.org/2011/02/
feds-stall-release-of-records-for-controversial-immigration-enforcement-program/;
Illinois Activists, Sheriffs Blast Secure Communities Program, Fox News Latino (Mar. 29, 2011), http://
latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/03/29/illinois-activists-sheriffs-blast-secure-communities-
program/ (quoting Joshua Hoyt, Executive Director of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrants 
and Refugee Rights as saying, “It sounds like a conspiracy by the Department of Homeland 
Security just to persecute Mexicans and destroy families.”); see also supra note 13; Part IIA.
151 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Communication Regarding 
Participation in Secure Communities, OIG-12-66 (March 2012), available at http://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-
66_Mar12.pdf.
152 Elise Foley, Homeland Security’s ‘Secure Communities’ Didn’t Intentionally Deceive, Report Says, 
Huffington Post (Apr. 9, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/06/homeland-
security-secure-communities-report_n_1409105.html.
153 Danielle Riendeau, TRUST Act: California Could Set National Model for Correcting the Damage 
Done by S-Comm, ACLU of Northern California (July 23, 2012, 1:27 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/
immigrants-rights-racial-justice-national-security/trust-act-california-could-set-national.
154 40 Years of FOIA, 20 Years of Delay: Oldest Pending FOIA Requests Date Back to the 1980s, George 
Washington University Nat’l Sec. Archive (2007), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB224/ten_oldest_report.pdf.
155 Id. 
156 Activated Jurisdictions, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (dynamic web document that is 
updated frequently).
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critique of Secure Communities before it became active. This lack of 
transparency undermined not only the democratic process, but also the 
agency’s commitment to developing well-considered programs that 
incorporate public feedback.157
Another drawback to the way that FOIA functioned in Secure 
Communities was the monetary cost, both to requesters and taxpay-
ers. Although the FOIA request itself is generally not costly to the 
requester, the litigation that compels more prompt disclosures or 
enables FOIA requesters to challenge exemptions can be prohibitively 
expensive for some individual requesters. The NDLON FOIA litigation 
involved collaboration between students and faculty at Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law’s clinic, activists at NDLON and CCR, as well 
as pro bono services by the firm Mayer Brown, LLP. 158 The expense of 
these legal and research services, as well as the time and effort involved 
in strategizing the case, are significant. The FOIA request itself is a 
detailed twenty-one-page document that was necessarily crafted with 
meticulous detail to ensure the agency would be compelled to release 
comprehensive records on the program.159 Throughout the government, 
the cost to taxpayers to maintain agency instrumentality to respond to 
FOIA requests, as well as the cost of the DOJ to defend such requests, 
has far exceeded expectations.160 In 2010, the government-wide cost 
for agencies to implement FOIA procedures totaled $400 million and 
implicated 4,000 agency staff.161
Finally, in addition to the damage to public confidence, the expen-
ditures associated with requesting or executing a FOIA request, and 
the agency’s loss of valuable public feedback, DHS’s untimely release 
of information about Secure Communities through protracted litiga-
tion also resulted in incalculable losses to DHS in monetary and other 
resources that it expended responding to the public backlash. The 
untold sums that the agency spent clarifying its position in the months 
and years following the release of the FOIA documents, including costs 
157 See generally Dep’t Homeland Sec., Open Government Plan 2.0, available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-open-government-plan-v2.pdf; see also Cary Coglianese, Heather 
Kilmartin & Evan Mendelsen, Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: 
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 924, 927 (2009) (“Not only will 
transparency and public participation inevitably help to achieve democratic goals, but they also 
can help produce better, more informed policy decisions.”).
158 See NDLON v. ICE Synopsis supra note 76.
159 Bridget Kessler, supra note 13; see also Justin Cox, Maximizing Information’s Freedom: The Nuts, 
Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13 N.Y. City L. Rev. 387, 399–410 (2010) (describing the importance of 
drafting precise FOIA requests). 
160 FOIA’s Forty-Fifth Anniversary, supra note 45 (noting that, based on a survey taken ten years  
after FOIA took effect, FOIA cost approximately $50 million annually to implement, which 
was “far higher” than estimated, and in 2010 the overall grew to $400 million annually, which 
represents an increase of 700%).
161 Id.
 Legislation & Policy Brief 127
associated with its task force and its report, the efforts undertaken by 
DHS’s Inspector General and CRCL, and myriad press releases and 
policy documents further illustrate why responding to a FOIA request 
should not be the an agency’s primary vehicle for transparent policy-
making, as it was in Secure Communities.162
III. Recommendations
As exemplified by the role of FOIA in Secure Communities, obtaining 
information about agency action through FOIA requests is time-
consuming, expensive, and operates largely as a post hoc mechanism 
that does not afford the public meaningful opportunities to evaluate 
proposed policy. Reactive litigation is inadequate when Internet 
technology has made proactive disclosure of agency records an easily 
available option. Indeed, DHS could have improved transparency in 
Secure Communities if it had released more of the records that it ulti-
mately disclosed pursuant to the NDLON litigation online as proactive 
disclosures. Secure Communities is a perfect example of why agencies 
should comply with the Open Government Initiative’s emphasis on 
proactive disclosures and make disclosable records readily-available 
online in advance of receiving a FOIA request.163
In addition to examining the merits of proactive FOIA disclosures 
in agency policymaking, this Article also seeks to highlight simple, 
commonsense ways that agencies could make proactively disclosed 
FOIA records more accessible. Although it is also not a perfect resource, 
the website tracking the NDLON FOIA litigation—which is located at 
http://uncoverthetruth.org/category/foia-documents/ and shared by 
NDLON, CCR, and Cardozo Law School—catalogues much of the same 
data that DHS could have posted online as proactive disclosures about 
Secure Communities. Thus, the “Uncover the Truth” site provides a 
useful starting point for examining an alternative platform for sharing 
agency records proactively disclosed under FOIA. Indeed, the website 
cataloging the disclosed Secure Communities FOIA documents is easily 
a more comprehensive and user-friendly resource for accessing FOIA 
records on Secure Communities than the resources available through 
DHS. If these non-profit organizations are able to create a user-friendly 
162 See supra notes 141–47 and surrounding text.
163 This suggestion directly comports with the recommendation made by the Task Force on 
Transparency and Public Participation, which was convened by the organization OMB Watch, 
stating that: “Agencies should streamline the FOIA request process by publishing electronically 
not only (i) the records that FOIA requires an agency to release without first receiving a request, 
but also (ii) any documents that an agency or court has previously determined not to fall within 
a FOIA exemption.” Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelsen, supra note 157 at 936–38, 963. This 
recommendation examines the existing statutory and administrative mandates for electronic 
proactive disclosure, including those discussed in Section IA of the Article, and finds that even  
the statutory disclosures required under FOIA “are not always made.” Id. at 937.
128 Unlocking Secure Communities
site for FOIA record disclosures, DHS can reasonably be expected to 
design a similarly accessible site, especially given its comparatively 
vast resources and statutory direction to do so.
A. Substance of Disclosures
As discussed in Part IA of this Article, FOIA’s existing statutory 
proactive disclosure mandate requires the release of certain types of 
records,164 the Obama Administration’s Open Government Initiative 
has expanded an agency’s obligation to disclose additional materials 
as a matter of Executive policy, and DHS responded to the Initiative 
by bolstering its commitment to proactive disclosures.165 Despite the 
broad scope of these statutory, administrative, and internal mandates, 
as of September 2012, DHS’s proactive disclosure page still includes 
only five documents containing general information on Secure 
Communities. Among these are three outdated documents from 2009, 
as well as Memorandums of Agreement between DHS and participat-
ing states.166 These limited proactive disclosures were unhelpful in pre-
venting the controversy surrounding Secure Communities, and fail to 
reach the agency’s full disclosure potential under FOIA and the Open 
Government Initiative.
To the contrary, the Uncover the Truth website containing DHS’s 
disclosures pursuant to the litigation goes far beyond the handful of 
documents on DHS’s website to provide expansive and detailed records 
on Secure Communities. These records clarify many of the questions 
that sparked the controversy surrounding Secure Communities. 
Perhaps most importantly, unlike DHS’s disclosures, they concretely 
evidence that the agency advanced inconsistent policies. For instance, 
the Uncover the Truth site includes two legal memoranda that evidence 
DHS’s conflicting legal views on whether state participation in Secure 
Communities must be voluntary to pass constitutional muster.167 The 
first memoranda, which is undated, discusses a deployment plan 
that is slated to run through 2012 and specifically states that “Secure 
Communities’ current internal position is that the decision to allow an 
LEA to ‘opt out’ rests with the State.”168 Another memoranda, dated 
164 Freedom of Information Act § 552(a)(2).
165 Mary Ellen Callahan, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Proactive Disclosure and Departmental 
Compliance with Subsection (a)(2) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (2009), available  
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/foia_proactive_disclosure.pdf.
166 FOIA Proactive Disclosures, supra note 107.
167 Compare “Opt Out Background,” ICE FOIA 10-2674.0002927 available at http://uncoverthetruth.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Opt-Out-Background.pdf, with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, ICE FOIA 10-2674.0010797, (Oct. 2, 2010),
available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf.
168 “Opt Out Background,” ICE FOIA 10-2674.0002927. available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Opt-Out-Background.pdf.
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October 2, 2010, states that, beginning in 2013, Secure Communities 
will be mandatory.169 These records convey exactly the information that 
the public and local lawmakers needed to be able to make an informed 
decision about the merits of the Secure Communities initiative: 
confirmation that DHS was at least considering making participation 
in Secure Communities mandatory.
To fully implement the Open Government Initiative’s mandate that 
it proactively disclose “useful” information, DHS should proactively 
disclose records pertaining to important, controversial, programs like 
Secure Communities online, even if those records may be embarrass-
ing or evidence inconsistency. Indeed, the “utility” of such records can 
scarcely be questioned. The public should not have gleaned informa-
tion about the voluntariness of Secure Communities through sources 
like a media leak by an “ICE official, speaking on the condition of 
anonymity because he was not authorized to talk about the involun-
tary nature of the program.”170 Disseminating information in this way 
only fueled media reports of conspiracy and inspired distrust. Further, 
DHS’s current messaging about the “confusion” that “some” of its 
public statements caused still seems less than forthcoming,171 because 
it rather disingenuously suggests that there was some ambiguity about 
whether DHS’s statements were in conflict. Releasing actual agency 
records that document important policy inconsistencies or changes 
would at least have made clear to the public that DHS’s policy on the 
voluntariness of Secure Communities was in flux. Indeed, this type of 
disclosure is precisely what Congress envisioned when it created FOIA 
to prevent agencies from concealing information to “cover up embar-
rassing mistakes and irregularities.”172
B. Manner of Disclosures
Although not explicitly addressed in the FOIA statute, the Open 
Government Initiative explicitly implores agencies to post word- 
searchable records online in a manner than enables them to be 
retrieved.173 DHS’s current online proactive disclosures are not as 
accessible as they could be. As mentioned above in Section IA, rather 
than integrated into the main page of the Secure Communities website, 
169 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE FOIA 10-2674.0010797, (Oct. 2, 2010)
available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf.
170 See Vendantam, supra note 103. 
171 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Get the Facts, available at http://www.ice.gov/secure_
communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (indicating that “some of ICE’s past public 
statements led to confusion about whether state and local jurisdictions can opt out of the program.”). 
A more appropriate comment would be that ICE released directly contradictory statements.
172 S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 38 (1966). 
173 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB Bull. No. M-10-06: 
Memorandum to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies 2 (2009).
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DHS’s proactive disclosures pertaining to Secure Communities are 
contained on a separate, unlinked page of its website entitled “FOIA 
Proactive Disclosures.”174 Several of these documents are word-search-
able, but to locate them a member of the public would need to have 
a sufficient understanding of FOIA to know that such a term existed. 
Additionally, DHS also maintains several other disclosure websites, 
including its FOIA library, Open Government Webpage, as well as 
other component-specific electronic reading rooms, none of which is 
linked to the others.175 None of these resources appear to have infor-
mation on Secure Communities. Although data.gov, another Obama 
Administration tool for disclosure, hosts a home page touting the 
number of apps and datasets that are affiliated with the webpage to 
promote transparency, a search for “secure communities” in the search 
bar yields zero results.176
Although not an ideal resource, the Uncover the Truth site’s 
catalogue of FOIA documents makes significant headway toward 
making them accessible to the public. Each time that they obtained 
a batch of documents from DHS during the FOIA litigation, the 
NDLON Requesters posted them online under headings that describe 
the subject matter discussed therein. Although some of the headings 
are subjectively framed to reflect a policy perspective,177 others offer 
straightforward labels indicating, for instance, that they contain col-
lections of documents that pertain to Secure Communities’ impact on 
vulnerable groups or ICE detainers.178 They also posted indexes within 
groups of records that identify each document contained therein, its 
date, and a summary of the information included.179 Smaller documents 
can be opened as portable document files (PDFs) in the user’s Internet 
browser, and larger document sets can be downloaded as zip files. 
Within each zip file, documents are named by date and are catalogued 
in an index. Although it could certainly be improved, the NDLON 
Requesters’ system for organizing these documents thematically and 
174 FOIA Proactive Disclosures, supra note 107.
175 See Dep’t Homeland Sec., FOIA Library (last visited Sept. 29, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.dhs.
gov/foia-library; Dep’t of Homeland Sec, Transparency at the Department of Homeland Security  
(Sept. 29, 2012, 4:50 PM), http://www.dhs.gov/transparency.
176 Data.gov, Search (“secure communities”) (last visited Sept. 26, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.data.
gov/search/node/%22secure%20communities%22%20.
177 See, e.g., “NDLON v. ICE – Documents Show Projected Growth in Immigration Detention Due 
to Secure Communities” http://uncoverthetruth.org/category/foia-documents/.
178 For a listing of the FOIA documents visit http://uncoverthetruth.org/ and click “FOIA 
documents.”
179 See, e.g., Uncoverthetruth.org, Secure Communities (S-Comm) Documents, Index of Records Released 
April 10, 2012, Documents Released by ICE Relating to vulnerable Groups (victims, Witnesses, Juveniles, 
U.S. Citizens), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/ICE-Vulnerable-
Groups-Documents-for-Release-Index-Final.pdf.
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by date dramatically increases public access to information beyond 
the piecemeal document lists on DHS’s website.180
Agencies should affirmatively strive to make accessing disclo-
sures as user-friendly as possible, and the strategies employed on 
the Uncover the Truth site are a great way to start. To the extent pos-
sible, agencies should utilize PDF files that are easily downloadable 
and searchable so that readers can locate information quickly.181 This 
technology also enables individuals to utilize Adobe software to make 
notes on the documents once they are saved on the viewer’s computer. 
Also, as on the Uncover the Truth site, cataloguing the records and 
providing brief summaries of their contents in an index is an excel-
lent way to aid users in locating records, particularly records that are 
not searchable. Unlike both DHS’s website and the Uncover the Truth 
website, FOIA proactive disclosures should not be labeled as “FOIA 
Documents,” “Proactive Disclosures,” or using any other such opaque 
quasi-legal designation. A stakeholder’s ability to access information 
should not be hampered by a lack of knowledge of the FOIA statute. 
A straightforward heading like “Electronic Copies of Original Agency 
Records” would clearly and accurately convey to users what the docu-
ments are, and a subheading designating the statutory or administra-
tive mandate that the agency seeks to fulfill with the disclosure would 
not confuse the viewer. Lastly, like the Uncover the Truth site, records 
should be consolidated as much as possible for easy access. Agency 
records are much less accessible to the public when they are isolated 
in separate sections of agency websites, or even separate sites, but if 
such separation is necessary then they should at least be linked to the 
main program page or to each other. To avoid the costly problems that 
plagued Secure Communities, agencies should prioritize making it as 
easy as practicable for the public to navigate webpages that contain 
document disclosures.
Conclusion
Agencies have a unique role in the U.S. government because, 
unlike the three branches, they are not explicitly provided for in the 
Constitution. Much of their important work implementing policy is 
less transparent and accessible to the public than the other branches. 
Arguably, as society’s problems—and accordingly the solutions to 
those problems—have become increasingly complex, the mechanism 
180 FOIA Proactive Disclosures, supra note 107.
181 This suggestion is also consistent with the Task Force on Transparency and Public 
Participation’s recommendation that: “Agencies should create online FOIA document libraries that 
allow the public to search and access documents that the agency or a court has determined not to 
be exempt from FOIA disclosure.” Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelsen, supra note 157 at 943.
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that puts internal agency documents into the hands of stakeholders 
becomes of paramount importance.
The role of FOIA in Secure Communities highlights the need for 
agencies to proactively disclose records. Between DHS’s implementa-
tion of Secure Communities in 2008 and DHS’s first document disclo-
sure in August 2010, the controversy surrounding Secure Communities 
steadily intensified.182 Had DHS released these critical records earlier, 
the debate on the legal and policy merits of Secure Communities 
would undoubtedly still have been vigorous, but the speculation and 
the frustration among the public over the lack of available informa-
tion would have been significantly curtailed. This would have saved 
untold monetary costs that DHS expended responding to the backlash 
against Secure Communities, as well as prevented irreparable damage 
to public trust. Further, improving the availability of data earlier in the 
policymaking process would have given the public an opportunity to 
review and consider the initiative, and thereby enhanced its quality 
and democratic accountability. Indeed, proactive disclosures support 
democracy because they support the public’s ability to shape policy, 
rather than simply react to it. Disclosing critical agency records online 
as early as possible in a manner that facilitates public access would 
fulfill President Obama’s mandate and truly make FOIA a tool for 
transparency, collaboration, and participation in government because 
it would enable the public to offer timely feedback on agency poli-
cies. Administrative agencies should view the role of FOIA in Secure 
Communities as a mistake that they cannot afford to repeat, and they 
should view proactive disclosures as a key tool for preventing similar 
missteps in the future.
182 See supra Part II.A and notes 13, 151.
